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SCHOCKER CONSTRUCTION 
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Appellant, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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Case No. 16670 
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Schocker Construction 
Company (hereinafter "Schocker") on a contract for 
repair and construction of a section of highway located 
on Interstate 80 in Tooele County between Low and Clive. 
Schocker sought recovery for damages resulting from 
alleged extra work, misrepresentation, changes in the 
design or character of construction, and for failure to 
pay amounts due under the contract. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found for Plaintiff on the 
q u es ti on of add i ti on a l vrn r k and awarded the total sum 
of $93,566.36 plus interest. The Court found adverse 
to Schocker on the question of payments withheld for 
failure to meet contract specifications. The Court 
determined that Schocker's claimed extra paving costs 
were to a large extent the fault of Schocker and awara: 
Schocker 16~~ of its total claimed damages related to 
asphalt removal and paving. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Def end ant see ks an Order of this Court affirm· 
ing the judgment of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I 
Defendant considers the statement of facts set 
out in Plaintiff's Brief to be insufficient, and fortk 
reason sets forth the following as a statement of fact>, 
d · · n of tnr pertinent to a reasonable review of the ec1s10 
Trial Court: 
1. The Pa rt i es entered i n to a contract d a tea , 
On I -80 bet\"1een Low and Clive August 11, 1975 for work 
-2-
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in Tooele County, to remove portions of the existing 
plant mix seal (minimum of 3/4") due to excessively 
rich asphalt; also for the removal of "ridges, ripples 
and corrugations" and for the placement of asphalt with 
a compacted depth of 2 1/2" over the entire roadway. 
In those areas v1here more than 3/4" of asphalt was 
removed, additional asphalt was to be placed in a 
"single lift" to restore the entire planned depth of 
asphalt. (Ex. P-1 & P-2) 
2. Said contract covers a highway section 
approximately 20 miles in length with work to be done 
on both east- and westbound lanes making a total of 
approximately 80 lane miles. 
3. The contract is a unit price contract 
with the estimated bid price being $2,182,198. (Ex. P-1) 
4. The existing surface varied considerably 
as to its condition with the worst rippling and rutting 
as well as saturated oil condition existing on the western 
slope of the area known as Grassy Mountain. (T. 352) 
5. The oil-rich bituminous material was removed 
from the roadway surface in areas designated by the Defen-
dant's Project Engineer. 
6. The material removed was removed by the use 
o f a " h e a t e r - p l a n e r " a n d vi a s o p e r a t e d by L. C · N e l s o n , 
- 3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the owner of said equipment under a subcontract. 
7. The amount of asphalt removed was 
increased by direction of Defendant's Engineer, Don 
ifright, and Plaintiff was paid the unit price for all 
material removed from the roadway. 
8. The depth of removal varied from 3/4" 
to as much as four to six inches. (T. 246, T. 622, 
Findings of Fact No. 8) 
9. The contract contained a provision re-
quiring that the asphalt be placed in a "single lift.' 
(T. 245, P. 1) 
10. Plaintiff had difficulty in complying 
w i th th e " s i n g 1 e - l i f t " p r o v i s i o n , pa r t i cu l a r l y i n l rn. 
(T. 246, T. 387, 403) 
11. P 1 a i n t i ff w a s a l l owed to us e a " l eve 11 inc 
course" both in 1975 and 1976, but the results were no'. 
materially better 1·1hen said "levelling course" was useu 
than when the material was placed in a single lift. 
(T. 578-579, T. 803) 
12. Due to surface i rregul ariti es, particular 
those resulting from Plaintiff's work in 1975, thePlai 
tiff used the "heater-planer" to correct said surface 
i r reg u l a r it i es i n 19 7 6 a t a cl a i med cost of $15 • 0 OD· (l 
402-403) 
-4-
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13. The cost of removal of asphalt from 
Plaintiff's subcontractor L. C. Nelson was substan-
tially less than the unit bid price, leaving Plaintiff 
v1ith an apparent profit. (Ex. P-1 and T. 439) 
14. Plaintiff's unit price for the contract 
item of bituminous surface course 3;4u maximum included 
the cost of the mineral aggregate production and the 
hauling, placing and compacting of the material as well. 
(P. 3, Sec. 403.15) 
15. Placement of material at varying depths 
would not increase the costs of producing or hauling 
the material, but could increase the costs of place-
ment and of compaction. 
16. Of the total of 80 lane miles, approxi-
mately 15 lane miles or 16.67% of the total contained 
material which was removed to a depth greater than the 
minimum depth specified in the contract. (T. 722 and 795) 
17. Plaintiff's testimony showed that it ih-
curred additional costs for problems associated with 
the excess asphalt removal or placement of material to 
varying depths in the total sum of $323,196. (Ex. P-17) 
18. The evidence at the time of trial dis-
closed that much of Plaintiff's extra costs as claimed 
by Plaintiff were the result of internal problems attrib-
utable to poor planning and judgment by Plaintiff or were 
-5-
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associated ~1ith weather problems, most of which viere 
not the fault of Defendant. (D-87, D-89, T. 380, 
387, 414-427, 548, 582, 617, 620-622, 726-730, 744-
783, 803) 
19. The Trial Court after considering the 
evidence determined that Plaintiff was entitled to 16'. 
of its claimed total amount of extra costs amounting 
to the sum of $51,711.36. (Findings of Fact No. 9anc 
10) 
20. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff 
was entitled to an award of extra costs for the paving· 
of approaches and ramp roads not shown on the plans bo:, 
for bituminous surface course and seal coat and deter· 
mined said amount to be $41,855. (Findings of Fact 
No. 22 and Conclusions of Law No. 1) 
21. The Plaintiff is appealing only that por-
tion of the Trial Court's award based on alleged extra 
c o s ts as s o c i a t e d 1v i th p av i n g i n a re a s of v a r y i n g de P th 
The Defendant elected not to appeal the judgment of the 
Court. 
22. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the 
Findinas of Facts, Conclusions of Law and For Recon· 
d th theory ad vanced in its I sideration and argue e same 
brief on appeal to the Trial Judge. The Trial Judge 
-6-
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denied Plaintiff's Motion after hearing argument. 
(T. 227 and 231) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES TO 
PLAINTIFF FOR EXCESSIVE COSTS OF PLACING 
ASPHALT IS PROPER. 
There was considerable conflict in the testi-
many before the Trial Court as to the amount of damage 
allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff for work associated 
with removing an existing asphalt surface and replacing 
same to the preexisting level and then overlaying the 
entire surface with an additional layer of asphalt. 
Plaintiff calculated its damages based on a "total cost 
theory'' of damages which theory Defendant objected to. 
Plaintiff asserts its damages amount to the sum of 
$323,196. (Ex. P-17) The evidence before the Court 
shows that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a sup-
plemental agreement in late 1975 to increase the esti-
mated quantity of the bid item for removal of bitu~inous 
materia1 by 10,000 tons at the same unit price. The 
actual removal was performed by a subcontractor. 
The Standard Specifications provide that in 
the placement of bituminous asphalt that if the depth 
-7-
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of placement exceeds four inches it shall be done 
in two lifts. (P 3 S 303 09) Th 
. ec. . ere was a con-
flict in the testimony as to whether the Plaintiff 
in fact was allowed to use more than one lift in 1975 . 
The Defendant's Engineer who was on the proJ·ect every 
day said they were allowed to do so. (T. 798) The 
Plaintiff asserted it ~1as only permitted to lay a 
"skin patch" which the Plaintiff's witnesses argued 
did not constitute a "levelling course." Plaintiff 
contended that ~1ithout being allowed to lay a "level-
ling course" it could not achieve specification com-
pliance. 
In analyzing the evidence before the Court 
related to the damages claimed by Plaintiff it is 
obvious that the Trial Court discounted Plaintiff's 
damage claims as exaggerated. The Plaintiff was 
adequately compensated for the actual removal of the 
existing asphalt as is evident from its acceptance of 
the work order increasing the quantity at the same 
unit price after operations ceased in 1975. (Ex. 0-9) 
The unit price for "bituminous surface 
course" would only be affected by the increased depth 
of rem ova 1 i n two po s s i b 1 e are as ; the cos t of P 1 acing 
the material and the cost of compacting the material. 
The other costs involved, 1~hich are the production of 
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the mineral aggregate, and the mixing and hauling 
were obviously not adversely affected by the increased 
amount needed to replace the excavated material since 
costs associated with these operations are relatively 
fixed. 
Plaintiff knew of the increase in quantity 
of the bituminous surface course item in time to crush 
the additional aggregate. The increased quantity should 
have resulted in a benefit to the Plaintiff since the 
mobilization cost of its crushing equipment would have 
already been recovered in the planned quantity and its 
production costs reduced accordingly. 
The Defendant through at least five different 
witnesses established that most of the difficulty the 
Plaintiff encountered, particularly in 1975, was the 
result of mismanagement, incompetence, adverse weather 
and other factors not the fault of Defendant. (Exs. 
D. 87 & 89) It was further evident from the testimony 
that Defendant through its employees, notably Bob 
Charlesworth, assisted Plaintiff in working out inter-
nal problems during 1976. (T. 578, 579, 803) 
It was also apparent that Defendant's actions 
in 1975 were an attempt to require the Plaintiff to com-
ply with the contract requirements, (T. 264, 459) It 
was further apparent that Defendant allowed modifications 
-9-
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to the contract which were of substantial benefit 
to the Plaintiff. (T. 793, 794, 799) 
The Court therefore rejected the Plaintiff's 
claims as to the amount of its damages and chose, on 
the basis of substantial evidence in the record, to 
award the Plaintiff damages based on a percentage of 
the amount claimed by Plaintiff, 
In the case of Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 
22 U.2d 49, 448 P.2d 709 (1968), this Court said the 
following regarding the method adopted by the Trial 
Court in that case to assess damages as follows: 
... Speaking generally about 
damages, the desired objective is to 
evaluate any loss suffered by the most 
direct, practical and accurate method 
that can be employed. 
We have no disagreement with the pro-
position that the fact-trier should not 
be permitted to arbitrarily ignore, com-
petent, credible and uncontradicted evi-
dence. Nevertheless, he is not bound 
to slavishly follow the evidence and the 
figures given by any particu~ar.wit~ess. 
Within the limits of reason it is his 
prerogative to place his own apprai~al 
upon the evidence which impress~s him 
as credible and to draw conclusions 
therefrom in accordance with his own 
best judgment. (Citations omitted) 
In the case of Gardner v. The Calvert, 25 3 f. 
09 h Court speaking about the amount of damac 395, 3~ , t e 
to be a 1v a rd e d after the fact of l o s s i s est ab l is h ed ,\ 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Court can estimate the amount of damages: 
... from the facts in evidence 
including the inferences to be drawn ' 
from them, and the probabilities which 
they suggest. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court 
has adopted a practical method of determining the dam-
ages which Plaintiff is entitled to for costs associated 
with paving portions of the roadway in areas where the 
excavation varied more than could reasonably have been 
anticipated by the Plaintiff at the time of bidding. 
Plaintiff in its brief apparently misconstrues 
the meaning and intent of the Court's conclusion regard-
ing damages to be awarded for the "overrun in bituminous 
surface course including specifically those alleged prob-
lems involved with excessive removal of existing asphalt," 
as set forth in Conclusion of Law No. 2. Plaintiff also 
apparently forgot that Exhibit P-17 was the subject of 
considerable interest to the Trial Court and prompted 
several questions by the Trial Judge of Plaintiff's 
principal witness, Robert Schocker. (See T. 320 to 323) 
In the interchange between the Court and Mr. Schocker, 
the following took place beginning at the bottom of page 
320 of the trial transcript: 
Schocker: Okay, the $323,196 is 
based on the time it took to pave the 
project. In other words, we added up 
all our equipment costs and got so many 
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hours, and so many dollars, and overrun 
from what we bid of $323,196.00. 
The Court: Allright. 
Schocker: Then you want me to contini: 
down? 
The Court: No, your counsel will 00 • 
from now. I didn't know what you meant by:t 
word, I realize in your business, your trade 
~here are
1
some terms that have a meaning ana' 
Just v1asn t sure what you meant by overrun. 
Ju s t s hows the surface cost you $ 3 2 3 , 19 6. oo 
more than you bid. 
Sc hocker: You are right, Your Honor. 
Schocker later recounts how Plaintiff's cost< 
were totaled and the payment received from the State 
deducted to arrive at the above figure. 
It is clear, therefore, that the Court basea 
the testimony of Bob Schocker understood the amount 1i 
on Exhibit P-17 of $323,196.00 to be Schocker's claime 
extra costs for the bituminous surface course "overrun 
on the total project and not just that amount require( 
the excess removal area as now asserted by Plaintiff: 
its brief. 
The justification for extra compensation over 
the contract amount is to be found in the Standard Spt 
fications, Section 104.02(4). (Ex. P-3) The Specifii 
a "chanc' tion allows a supplemental agreement to cover 
in plan or in the character of construction." The oe" 
dant objected to any allowance on the basis that Plair: 
-12-
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had not served notice of its claim in writing until 
after the fact. The Court in its Conclusion of Law 
No. 2 concluded that Plaintiff was excused from this 
procedural requirement, which point the Defendant 
concedes. The Court concluded that removal of asphalt 
to excess depths on 16% of the roadway was to be recog-
nized as either a "change of plan" or a "change in the 
character of construction." 
The testimony, apparently believed by the 
Court, tended to show that while the excess removal 
created problems for the Plaintiff it was by no means 
the only problem, and the Court apparently elected to 
use a percentage factor multiplied against Plaintiff's 
total claimed costs to arrive at an amount of damages 
to be awarded for the "overrun" claimed by Plaintiff. 
The Trial Court clearly understood what it 
was doing in calculating damages due Plaintiff, and the 
assertion by Plaintiff that the Trial Court "simply mis-
calculated Schocker's damages" is simply not true. This 
is further obvious since the Plaintiff's assertion is 
essentially the same argument advanced in its Motion to 
Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and For 
Reconsideration, which Motion the Trial Court heard and 
denied. 
-13-
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POINT II 
SCHOCKER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
GUARANTEED PROFIT. 
Schocker's contention that "because of its 
additional costs incurred by Schocker it lost its 
expected profit of $120,119.00" and is entitled now 
to recover it, is to say the least a novel approach. 
The fallacy of this argument is certainly obvious. 
To have any hope of recovery, the Plaintiff 
would have to prove that its profit projection in its 
bi d ~1 as re as on ab 1 e and th a t i t w o u 1 d have i n fact made 
such a profit. Secondly, Plaintiff would have to show 
that none of its additional costs were in any 11ay the 
fa u 1 t of P l a i n t i ff o r we re a t t r i bu ta b 1 e t o the actions 
of Plaintiff. Defendant does not question that Plain· 
tiff's "contract rate" of 5.94% profit is a reasonable 
percentage of profit which a contractor would hope to 
recover, but there is certainly insufficient evidence 
before the Court to establish that Plaintiff has ever 
in fact earned such a profit or that Plaintiff could 
have done so in this case. The evidence further fails 
to establish that Plaintiff did not create most of the 
problems it encountered. 
l bl W,. th Plaintiff' There is an additiona pro em 
claim, and that is the fact that Plaintiff's witness 
-14-
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Robert Schocker admitted that Plaintiff's bid on the 
item of "bituminous surface course" is "unbalanced." 
(T. 322) This means the actual bid item unit price 
is reduced from the amount the Plaintiff determined 
the bid for that item should be, and the amount of the 
reduction is then placed in another bid item. We do 
not know the amount by which the item was reduced 
nor where that amount was placed in the bidding 
schedule. It is thus obvious that with the evidence 
before the Court an additional award to Plaintiff for 
"profit" on the "bituminous surface course" bid item 
might result in a windfall to the Plaintiff. 
Schocker has cited the case of Whitmeyer Bros. 
Inc. v. State, 406 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978} as authority for 
recovery of profit. The decision in that case is proper 
since the Court under the fact situation therein decided 
to award the full amount of the plaintiff's claimed 
extra costs and the "overhead and profit" would properly 
apply to the full amount as an additional element of cost. 
In this case, the Trial Judge was aware of what the fig-
ures on Exhibit P-17 represented. The question of profit 
and how it was to be handled was discussed in the trial. 
(T. 319, 330-335) The Trial Judge knew exactly what he 
was doing, and his fuilure to add an additional sum for 
profit to the amount awarded the Plaintiff is intentional. 
-15-
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q 
This contention was again argued to the Trial Judge 
in Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Con. 
-
clusions of Law, Judoment and For Reconsideration and 
denied by the Court. 
In the case of Sornsin Construction Co. v. 
State of Montana, 590 P.2d 125 (1978), also cited by 
Plaintiff in its brief, the Court again determined 
that the Plaintiff's actual costs were "presumed to 
be reasonable" and that the State failed in proving 
the costs were unreasonable. In this case, there 
was an abundance of proof to show that plaintiff's 
costs were "unreasonable" and that they did not relate 
solely to work associated with the excess thickness 
but that they also related to the cost of paving gen· 
erally. (Exhibits D. 87 and D. 89, T. 414, 415, 41), 
420, 427, 548, 620, 645, 726-730, 775, 777-783.) 
The Court quite properly rejected the claim of Plain-
tiff regarding profit. Since the Court opted to awar~ 
Plaintiff less than the amount claimed and was fully 
cognizant of Plaintiff's claimed costs including prof!: 
the award of damages by the Trial Court in a lesser 
amount obviously include profit as an element of those 
damages as determined by the Court. 
Plaintiff also cited the case of~ 
J)3 
C a 11 a h a n \J a 1 k e r C o n s t . C o . , 3 l 7 U . S . 5 6 , 6 3 S · Ct · 
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(1942). This case does not apply, however, for the 
reason that it involves different contractual provi-
sions involving "changes" or "disputes" which are 
not included in the contract between the parties to 
this litigation. As a point of information, the 
ruling of the Supreme Court in said case resulted in 
a denial of recovery by the Plaintiff. The Defendant 
does not dispute that the Trial Court could have awarded 
additional damages consisting of "profit," but the Court 
failed to do so with full knowledge that Plaintiff 
claimed to be entitled to same. 
In any event, there is substantial evidence 
in the record to support the Trial Court in awarding 
less than the amount sought by Plaintiff. There is 
equally as much evidence in the record to support 
the Court in not awarding an additional element of 
damage for Plaintiff's claimed profit. The Plaintiff 
simply failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it earned a profit or could have done 
so in the absence of the claimed extra paving effort 
by the Plaintiff. In fact, the Court specifically 
concluded in Conclusion of Law No. 5 "that Plaintiff 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it was entitled to recover damages other than those 
specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of these Conclusions 
-17-
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of Law." lParagraph 1 dealt with the ramps and 
approaches and paragraph 2 allowed recovery for 
16% of Plaintiff's claimed costs associated with 
excessive removal of asphalt.) The Court then went 
on to find and conclude in said paragraph 5 that: 
The Court further finds that 
damages alleged by Plaintiff under its 
total cost approach were not the fault 
of the State but were the result of such 
things as problems in the setting up and 
internal operations of Plaintiff's plant 
and improper equipment or were associated 
with the weather or other factors not the 
responsibility of Defendant. 
Finally, the Court concluded in Conclusion 
of Law No. 6 that Plaintiff was "not entitled to its 
claim for profit as set forth in its exhibits since 
profit, if any, is a part of the unit cost of indi-
vidual items set forth in the contract." 
Certainly no contractor who operates under 
the competitive bid process is entitled to a guaranteo 
profit. If a contractor encounters conditions in the 
performance of a contract which are other than those 
presented in the pl ans and specifications, and if the 
contractor fol lows the procedural requirements of noti 
d sic· to the contracting agency and follows procedures e, 
to properly account for the extra effort, then the coi· 
· 1 d t l · f Under the situation °1 tractor is ent1t e o re 1e . 
lined, the contractor should recover his "reasonable 
-18-
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cos ts" of performing the extra work. If on the other 
hand the contractor is already in a situation where 
the contractor is losing money in performance of the 
contract due to internal problems such as inefficiency, 
incompetence, lack of diligent prosecution or other 
factors not the fault of the contracting agency, then 
the contractor must stand the loss without expecting 
the contracting agency to indemnify that loss. If in 
the latter situation, the contractor encounters condi-
tions which were not as represented, then the contractor 
is entitled to recover those additional "reasonable costs" 
but not those costs attributable to the contractor's own 
internal problems. To compensate a contractor for all 
costs incurred without distinguishing between the source 
of the fault does violence to the theory of competetive 
bidding. Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court has distinguished between those costs Plaintiff 
incurred as a result of internal problems and those 
resulting from unforeseen circumstances and has com-
pensated Plaintiff for its "reasonable costs" (includ-
ing profit thereon) of performing extra work. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the judg-
ment of the Trial Court is amply sustained by the record. 
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The Court adopted a reasonable and practical method 
of awarding Plaintiff recovery for work items not 
shown on the plans. The ramps and approach road 
cost Plaintiff additional amounts to complete, and 
the Court accepted Plaintiff's evidence fully on 
these items. The Court because of the conflict in 
the evidence chose not to accept Plaintiff's evidenc: 
on the excess paving costs. The Court greatly dis-
counted Plaintiff's evidence and elected to compensat0 
P l a i n t i ff o n th e b as i s o f a per c en ta g e o f the cl aimed 
amount. Finally, the Court specifically rejected 
P l a i n t i ff ' s c l a i med p r o f i t am o u n t s . Th e e v i den c e sup· 
ports the Court in this determination. The record 
discloses that Plaintiff's own internal operations 
were the cause of most of Plaintiff's inefficiency 
and failure to earn a profit. Obviously, the public 
should not indemnify Plaintiff for its own inefficient, 
Defendant respectfully requests that this 
Court sustain the decision of the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
. . -~~;-~ <r-1 --?~ j ~· /-· [./;o;.,, //. , . ~-: :·t_L..--
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Assistant Attorney Ged , 
Attorney for Respon en, 
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